Scientific publications

Е.З. Мохонько.

О дискретных режимах получения информации в неантагонистической повторяющейся игре

// Математическая Теория Игр и ее Приложения, т. 12, в. 1. 2020. C. 3-18

Keywords: dynamic non-antagonistic game, optimum regime of the information receipt, Nash equilibrium

The gain functions depend on the choices of players and time. The set of choices of the second player is changed in time according to one of some variants. The true variant is ascertained during the game. The current information about the set of choices and about partner’s choices is received as sample data. An optimal discrete procedure of obtaining information is found that allows preserving the equilibrium.

DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8

Indexed at RSCI, RSCI (WS)

vol_12_1_03-18_mokhonko.pdf (115 Kb, total downloads: 94)

Last modified: December 22, 2020